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Abstract—Formal analysis techniques are widely used today
in order to verify and analyze communication protocols. In this
work, we launch a quantitative verification analysis for the low-
cost Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) protocol proposed
by Song and Mitchell. The analysis exploits a Discrete-Time
Markov Chain (DTMC) using the well-known PRISM model
checker. We have managed to represent up to 100 RFID tags
communicating with a reader and quantify each RFID session
according to the protocol’s computation and transmission cost
requirements. As a consequence, not only does the proposed
analysis provide quantitative verification results, but also it
constitutes a methodology for RFID designers who want to
validate their products under specific cost requirements.
Index Terms—Discrete Time Markov Chains; Probabilistic
Model Checking; RFID; Quantitative Analysis.
I. INTRODUCTION
Formal analysis techniques, such as probabilistic model
checking, are widely used today in order to analyze and verify
communication protocols [3], [6]. In bibliography, security
protocols being published with flaws [1], [10], [11] constitute
examples that empower the necessity of using formal methods
prior to the design and implementation of a communication
protocol. At the same time, given that security is a fundamental
issue in communication protocols [3], [9], quantitative formal
analysis can be applied to obtain useful results regarding both
the validation of their security properties and the cost to
support them [3], [12]. This is important, since the tradeoff
of gaining in security is losing in terms of computation
cost. Therefore, cost should not been overlooked throughout
quantitative analysis, since it can be a prohibited design param-
eter, especially for protocols executed by low-cost hardware
devices, such as RFID tags.
RFID tags are used in industry for supply-chain manage-
ment, payment systems and inventory monitoring [13] and
constitute one of the three (3) basic entities of an RFID
system along with RFID readers and a server. One of the great
challenges in the field of RFID is the integration of secure
tag identification with low-cost computation and memory
expenditure [14]. This requirement forces the tag manufac-
turers to look for lightweight authentication solutions which
preserve security guaranties of an RFID protocol session. In
a real-world scenario, RFID protocol operates in a multi-
parallel session environment where a large number of sessions
between tags and reader will be established concurrently. The
latter rises up questions about the overall computation and
transmission cost for a reader-server to identify a group of
tags.
In this work, we propose the use of probabilistic model
checking [7] to verify the Song and Mitchell’s RFID authen-
tication protocol [14]. We develop a Discrete-Time Markov
Chain (DTMC) model [5] which represents a multiple tag
RFID scheme where tags’ authentications are validated. In
the PRISM framework, the aforementioned DTMC model is
augmented with computation and transmission cost require-
ments derived by [14]. We produce quantitative results for
computation cost of server and tags and for transmission cost
regarding up to 100 simultaneous parallel sessions. We also
provide server processing time and tags’ time delay results. To
the best of our knowledge, this is the first research effort that
performs a quantitative analysis of an RFID protocol using
probabilistic model checking.
II. SONG-MITCHELL’S RFID PROTOCOL
The Song and Mitchell’s protocol is a well-known authen-
tication protocol for low-cost RFID tags [14]. It comprises
three (3) basic entities, namely, a group of RFID tags Ti, an
RFID reader R that radio-communicates with Ti and a back-
end server S that contains the record identification database for
each tag Ti, i.e. [(ui, ti)new, (ui, ti)old, Di]. A single protocol
session consists of six (6) steps, as shown in Fig. 1. According
to the notation provided in Table I these steps are summarized
as follows:
1) Reader R generates a random value r1 ∈ ℜ[0, 1]l and
sends it to Ti.
2) Once Ti receives r1, it generates a random value r2 ∈
ℜ[0, 1]l, computes M1 = ti⊕ r2 and M2 = fti(r1⊕ r2)
and sends them to the reader R.
3) R forwards M1, M2 and the random bit-string r1 to the
server S.
4) S looks into its tag identity pairs database - both new
and old - for a ti such that r2 ← M1 ⊕ ti and M
′
2 =
fti(r1⊕r2) = M2. If no suitable ti is found, S sends an
error message to R and stops the session. Otherwise, Ti
Fig. 1. The analyzed Song-Mitchell’s RFID authentication protocol
has been authenticated by S which, in turn, computes
M3 = ui ⊕ (r2 ≫ l/2) and sends it to R along with
Di. After M3 transmission, S updates its tag database
as follows: sets ui(old), ti(old) to ui and ti, respectively,
and ui(new), ti(new) to (ui ≪ l/4)⊕(ti≫ l/4)⊕r1⊕r2
and h(ui(new)), respectively.
5) R forwards M3 to Ti.
6) Upon receipt of M3, Ti computes ui ← M3 ⊕ (r2 ≫
l/2) and checks if h(ui) = ti. If the check is true, then
S has been authenticated by Ti and Ti updates ti to
h((ui ≪ l/4) ⊕ (ti ≫ l/4) ⊕ r1 ⊕ r2). Otherwise, ti
remains the same.
In the above communication, the channel between the server
S and the reader R is secure, while R and Ti communicate
over an insecure channel. The proposed model considers two
different groups of tags, namely the groups TA and TB , with
n = 1, . . . , 50 tags Ti per group. Given this range of n, we
define N = 2, . . . , 100 to be the upper bound of tags that the
server S can authenticate concurrently.
III. RFID MODELING USING DTMC
The proposed analysis is based on probabilistic model
checking principles. The RFID protocol to be analyzed is
modeled using DTMCs in the PRISM model checking frame-
TABLE I
TABLE OF NOTATION
Symbol Description
T = {T1, . . . , Tn} Group of tags T , i = 1, . . . , n
n Number of tags, n = 1, . . . , 50
R RFID reader
S Back-end server
h Hash function
fk Keyed hash function
l The bit-length of a tag identifier
Di Information associated with tag Ti
ui An l-bit string assigned to Ti
ti Ti’s l-bit Identifier, ti = h(ui)
xnew The updated value of x
xold The most recent value of x
r Random string of l bits
⊕ XOR operator
work. The proposed model is augmented with computation
and transmission cost requirements derived by [14]. The reader
may obtain the developed RFID-DTMC model from [2].
In PRISM, a probabilistic model is defined as a set of m
modules , MD = {MD1, . . . ,MDm}. Each MDi module
is defined as a pair of (V ari, Ci), where V ari is a set of
integer-valued local variables with finite range and Ci is a set
of commands. The set V ari defines the local state space of
module MDi and in turn V ar denotes the set of all local
variables of the model, i.e., V ar =
⋃i=1
m V ari. Furthermore,
each variable v ∈ V ar has an initial value v¯.
Our DTMC model includes m = 4 modules, namely, MDS
representing both the server S and the reader R, MDTA
and MDTB for groups of tags TA and TB and MDMedium
for the communication medium between MDS , MDTA and
MDTB . The behavior of a module MDi is defined by the
set of commands Ci. Each command c ∈ Ci takes the form
of (g, (λ1, u1), . . . , (λnc , unc)), comprising a guard g and a
set of pairs (λj , uj), where λj ∈ ℜ>0 and uj is an update
for each 1 ≤ j ≤ nc. A guard g is a predicate over the set
of all local variables V ar and each uj update corresponds
to a possible transition of module MDi. If V ari contains ni
local variables, {v1, . . . , vni}, then an update takes the form
(v′1 = expr1) ∩ . . . ∩ (v
′
ni
= exprni), where exprj is an
expression in terms of the variables in V ar. Information of the
model may be omitted if an update ui does not affect some
variables V ari. In DTMC model specification, the constants
λj determines the probability attached to transitions (i.e., the
probability attached to transition that the update takes place),
thus, λj ∈ (0, 1] for 1 ≤ j ≤ nc and
∑nc
j=1 λj = 1 [4].
More specifically, a DTMC model is defined as a tuple
(S, s¯, P, L), where:
• S is a finite set of states
• s¯ ∈ S is the initial state
• P : S × S → ℜ≥0 is the transition probability matrix
such that
∑
s′∈S P (s, s
′) = 1 and
• L : S → 2AP is a labeling function mapping states to sets
of atomic propositions from a set AP with the properties
of interest
Terminating states are modeled by a single transition going
back to the same state with probability 1. DTMCs are further
described in [5]. In order to attach RFID cost parameters
into the developed DTMC model, we define reward modules
MDRC and MDRT which correspond to the RFID computa-
tion and transmission requirements, respectively [14].
Results will be acquired by defining the appropriate for-
mulae properties according to the Probabilistic Computational
Tree Logic (PCTL) [8]. The syntax of PCTL is as follows:
φ ::= true | α | φ ∧ φ | ¬φ | P⊲⊳p[ψ]
ψ ::= X φ | φ U≤t φ | φ U φ
where a is an atomic proposition, operator ⊲⊳∈ [≤, <,≥, >],
p ∈ [0, 1] and t ∈ ℵ≥0.
For a DTMC (S, s¯, P, L), a reward structure is a tuple (̺, ι),
where:
• ̺ : S → ℜ≥0 is a vector of state rewards, and
• ι : S × S → ℜ≥0 is a matrix of transition rewards.
DTMC allows the specification of four distinct types of
rewards R:
• Instantaneous R⊲⊳r[I=t]: the expected value of the reward
at time-instant t is ⊲⊳ r,
• Cumulative R⊲⊳r[C≤t]: the expected reward cumulated up
to time-instant t is ⊲⊳ r,
Fig. 2. The number of RFID tags under authentication as a function of time
for different upper bound of tags N
Fig. 3. Transmission cost of RFID authentication protocol as a function of
time for different upper bound of tags N
• Reachability R⊲⊳r[F φ]: the expected reward cumulated
before reaching φ is ⊲⊳ r,
• Steady-state R⊲⊳r[S]: the long-run average expected re-
ward is ⊲⊳ r.
Cumulative and rechability reward properties are employed for
the proposed quantitative verification of the proposed RFID-
DTMC model.
IV. QUANTITATIVE VERIFICATION RESULTS
The novelty of the current work is that for the first time
probabilistic model checking using DTMCs is employed in
order to verify the properties of the RFID authentication
protocol. In the proposed quantitative analysis we model
multiple RFID sessions according to the steps described in
Section II. Since, our model considers two groups TA and
TB of up to 50 tags each, it concludes that the server S can
authenticate concurrently an upper bound of up to N = 100
tags.
Fig. 2 represents the number of RFID tags which are under
authentication as a function of time expressed in time steps. It
is natural that as time passes the server S will authenticate
an increasing number of incoming tags Ti. However, this
number has a threshold equal to N , i.e., the upper bound
of tags being authenticated concurrently. We observe that for
N = 50, 75, 100 the corresponding curve is fixed at N and
this happens at time step 1100, 1600, 2200 respectively. This
means the smaller the N the sooner the curves’ fixing.
In line with the above observation, it is expected that
the transmission cost of the RFID protocol, which depends
on the number of tags under concurrent authentication, will
Fig. 4. Server- and tag-side computation cost as a function of the upper
bound of tags N
Fig. 5. Server processing time and tags’ time delay as a function of the
upper bound of tags N
be increased with time but it will not exceed an up limit
which indicates the time that the server S is constantly fully
occupied with N tags. Thus, Fig. 3 confirms that at time
step 1100, 1600, 2200 the tags’ authentication requests will be
fixed at their maximum keeping transmission cost unchanged.
Results depicted in Fig. 2 and 3 derived using cumulative
reward queries.
Apart from transmission cost, the proposed analysis incor-
porates the computation requirements of RFID protocol. More
specifically, according to [14], the server-side and tag-side cost
is exponential and linear to the number of tags, respectively.
In Fig. 4 we depict computation cost at server- and tag-side
as a function of N , for N = 10, . . . , 100, and we confirm the
expected curves’ trend.
We finally launch a set of experiments in order to compute
the service rate and mean tags’ delay. Fig. 5 shows that both
the server processing time and tags’ time delay are increased
in line with N , for N = 10, . . . , 100. Service rate is equal to
25 tags per time step while mean tags’ delay is approximately
4.5 time steps. Results depicted in Fig. 4 and 5 derived using
rechability reward queries.
An additional value of the proposed model, besides the
above results, is that it is designed to be configurable. Cost
requirements incorporating in the proposed model are protocol
dependant providing an analyst the capability of assigning
rewards according to the hardware specifications of a protocol.
V. CONCLUSION
Quantitative analysis using probabilistic model checking is
firstly used in this work in order to verify cost requirements of
the Song and Mitchell’s RFID authentication protocol, while
its security properties are preserved. We have managed to
create a representative cost weighted DTMC model within the
PRISM model checking environment, towards the quantitative
analysis of a parallel session scenario that include up to 100
RFID tag identifications.
Apart from results launched by the proposed analysis, cur-
rent work provides insights for addressing cost-related issues
of RFID protocols and deciding upon their cost-dependent
viability in line with their security guarantees.
Our future plans involve the cost-based analysis of RFID
solutions [13] which propose some fixes for strengthening the
security of RFID protocols. In this way we will be able to
evaluate the computation cost caused by a fix solution. Fur-
thermore, our goal is to model and compare a series of Radio
Identification protocols using the proposed analysis. In this
way we will provide researchers and protocol designers with
a complete framework for quantitative analyzing any security
mechanism embedded in existing or new RFID protocols,
especially when exploiting low-cost hardware.
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